Corporate Enforcement Policy
The Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP) is a U.S. Department of Justice policy that offers companies defined benefits for voluntarily telling the government about criminal wrongdoing they discover, cooperating with investigators, and fixing the underlying problems. It is intended to encourage self-reporting by making the potential outcome more predictable for companies that come forward. This policy is specific to U.S. federal criminal enforcement and does not apply to matters outside that jurisdiction.
The Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP), formerly known as the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, is a U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division policy codified at Justice Manual 9-47.120. As revised in March 2026, it was extended into the Department's first uniform, Department-wide framework applying to all FCPA cases nationwide and other corporate criminal matters, providing concrete incentives for companies that voluntarily self-disclose discovered misconduct, cooperate, and remediate. The CEP is a prosecutorial charging and resolution policy governing how DOJ exercises enforcement discretion; it is not a compliance program standard, a certifiable framework, or a substitute for an organization's compliance and ethics infrastructure. Its scope is limited to U.S. federal criminal enforcement, and the specific benefits available and the conditions attached depend on the policy's precise text and DOJ's discretion in a given case. Practitioners should confirm current requirements, benefit tiers, and any effective dates against the primary policy text, and treat application to specific facts as a matter requiring qualified legal counsel.
Why it matters
The Corporate Enforcement Policy shapes one of the most consequential decisions a company faces after discovering potential criminal wrongdoing: whether to voluntarily disclose that conduct to the U.S. Department of Justice. Because the policy sets out defined benefits for companies that self-report, cooperate, and remediate, it is intended to make the outcome of coming forward more predictable than it would otherwise be. For compliance officers and legal teams, that predictability affects how internal investigations are scoped, how findings are escalated, and how the organization weighs the risks and potential benefits of disclosure. It is important to understand that these are incentives offered at DOJ's discretion, not guaranteed results; the actual benefit available in any matter depends on the policy's precise terms and the facts of the case.
The policy also carries weight because it was extended in its March 2026 revision into the Department's first uniform, Department-wide framework, applying to all FCPA cases nationwide and other corporate criminal matters. This broader reach means the same disclosure-and-cooperation framework now governs a wider range of federal criminal exposure than the earlier FCPA-specific version, which is relevant to how programs are designed to detect and respond to misconduct across multiple risk areas.
At the same time, the CEP should not be mistaken for a compliance program standard. It governs how prosecutors exercise charging and resolution discretion; it does not tell an organization how to build its code of conduct, training, risk assessment, or monitoring functions. Effective remediation, one of the conditions the policy contemplates, still depends on the strength of that underlying infrastructure. Its scope is also limited to U.S. federal criminal enforcement and does not extend to matters outside that jurisdiction, and applying it to specific facts is a matter requiring qualified legal counsel.
Who it's relevant to
Inside CEP
Common questions
Answers to the questions practitioners most commonly ask about CEP.